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Abstract
This paper investigates whether there are different patterns of traditionality in
different countries with regard to a perceived negative impact of labor-force
participation of mothers on their children and family life. For this purpose,
individual-level traditionality subgroups and segments of countries with dif-
ferent traditionality patterns of their nationals were identified simultaneously
by means of multilevel latent-class (ML-LC) analysis of the answers to three
items of the Changing Family and Gender Roles module of the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP). This module was fielded in 22 countries in the
years 1994 and 2002. Six individual-level subgroups and five country seg-
ments can be discerned. The structure of individual-level subgroups is almost
identical in both years. Four individual-level subgroups differ only quantita-
tively in their level of traditionality. Two further subgroups are characterized by
a unique tendency to defend working mothers against criticism. From 1994
to 2002 the sizes of traditional subgroups decrease, and there is also some change
in the composition of country segments.
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Resumen
Este trabajo analiza si existen diferentes patrones de tradicionalismo en los
diferentes países sobre la percepción de un impacto negativo de la participa-
ción laboral de las madres en sus hijos y en su vida familiar. Para ello se iden-
tificaron, de forma simultánea, subgrupos de tradicionalismo a nivel individual
y segmentos de países con diferentes patrones de tradicionalismo de sus ciuda-
danos, a través de un análisis multinivel de clases latentes (ML-LC) de las res-
puestas a tres preguntas del módulo Familia y Roles de Género del International
Social Survey Program (ISSP), que se aplicó en 22 países en los años 1994 y
2002. Se identificaron seis subgrupos de nivel individual y cinco segmentos de
países. La estructura de los subgrupos a nivel individual es casi idéntica en
ambos años. Cuatro subgrupos a nivel individual difieren solamente de mane-
ra cuantitativa en su nivel de tradicionalismo. Dos subgrupos más se caracte-
rizan por una tendencia a defender de la crítica a las madres que trabajan. De
1994 a 2002 el tamaño de los subgrupos tradicionales disminuye, y también se
ha producido algún cambio en la composición de los segmentos de países.
Palabras clave: análisis multinivel, análisis de clases latentes, roles de género,
sociedades contemporáneas, cambio social. 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
In the field of gender roles, considerable attitudinal change has been observed in
recent decades (Braun and Scott, 2009; Haller, Höllinger and Gomilschak, 2000).
Among these attitudes, beliefs about the consequences of female labor-force par-
ticipation for children are of special importance. They obviously influence gen-
eral gender ideologies which legitimize distinctions between women and men
with regard to their roles in family and society. In particular the traditional male
breadwinner – female carer view draws much of its legitimacy from assumptions
about  the  overall  consequences  which  labor-force  participation  of  mothers
might have for their children and family life.
One of the major data sources on which cross-national comparisons of
gender-role attitudes and their change over time has been based is the Inter  -
national Social Survey Program (ISSP) Family and Changing Gender Roles
module. It has been fielded in 1988, 1994, and 2002, and included at each of
these time points the following three items: 1. “A working mother can estab-
lish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who
does not work” (warm relation), 2. “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his
or her mother works” (child suffers), and 3. “All in all, family life suffers when
the woman has a full-time job” (family suffers). In the following we will, how-
ever, ignore the 1988 survey, in which too few countries participated.
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1994 data. He grouped the traditionally capitalist countries according to the
typology of welfare regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and
modified by Gornick and her collaborators (Gornick, 1999; Gornick, Meyers
and Ross, 1997, 1998). The basis of this classification is the socio-political ori-
entation and labor-market structure of the countries which should influence
the position of women on the labor market. It distinguishes a social-democrat-
ic type, prototypically represented by the Scandinavian countries, a liberal type,
mainly established by the Anglo-Saxon countries, and a conservative-corpo-
ratist type, mostly typical for the continental European countries. The former
socialist societies were classified into an additional fourth category. Table 1
gives an overview of the means of the three items, both in 1994 and 2002 in all
22 countries for which there are data for both points in time. The Philippines,
Israel, and Japan were not included in Braun’s (2006) study. 
According to the answers obtained for the two items child and family suf-
fers, the socialist countries apparently differ from each other in line with gen-
der differences observed before the advent of socialism. Many of these coun-
tries were mainly agrarian (Panayotova and Brayfield, 1997). Among them,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia are the most traditional countries. The coun-
tries which were industrialized early and to a higher degree are markedly less
traditional. Examples are the Czech Republic and, particularly, eastern Germany.
The corporatist countries hardly differ from the former socialist countries
with the exception of eastern Germany. Interestingly, in 1994, there is also hard-
ly any difference in traditionality between the social-democratic and the lib-
eral countries, despite entirely different societal conditions.
Taking into account also the data for the item warm relation gives a different
impression. According to their answers to this item, respondents in Central
Euro  pean corporatist countries, and in many of the former socialist countries,
seem to have markedly less traditional attitudes, although it seems to be slight-
ly less difficult nearly everywhere. This item addresses the suffering of the child
less directly. Braun (2006) argued that the item warm relation has two possible
interpretations, one regarding the consequences for the child, and the other a
judgment of the behavior of the mother. The second interpretation is more like-
ly for respondents from countries in which working mothers have been criticized
as "bad mothers" (Rueschemeyer and Schissler, 1990) who neglect their chil-
dren (characterized as "latchkey children") out of egoistic motives. Unless they
are extremely traditional, respondents confronted with this view might react
with a tendency to defend working mothers, independently of the consequences
they think labor-force participation of the mother has for their children. 
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Warm Child  Family  Warm  Child  Family 
relation suffers suffers relation suffers suffers
Corporatist countries
Western Germany 3.9 (1.2) 2.2 (1.1) 2.4 (1.2) 4.1 (1.1) 2.7 (1.2) 2.9 (1.3)
Austria 4.1 (1.3) 2.1 (1.2) 2.3 (1.3) 4.0 (1.2) 2.3 (1.2) 2.4 (1.3)
Spain 3.3 (1.2) 2.8 (1.1) 2.7 (1.1) 3.5 (1.2) 2.8 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1)
Former socialist countries
Eastern Germany 4.5 (0.8) 3.3 (1.2) 3.4 (1.2) 4.6 (0.7) 3.4 (1.3) 3.5 (1.3)
Hungary 3.5 (1.4) 1.9 (1.1) 2.2 (1.2) 3.8 (1.2) 2.2 (1.1) 2.5 (1.2)
Czech Republic 3.1 (1.4) 2.8 (1.3) 2.7 (1.3) 3.9 (1.2) 2.8 (1.3) 2.9 (1.3)
Slovenia 3.4 (1.2) 2.6 (1.1) 2.4 (1.0) 3.7 (1.1) 2.9 (1.1) 2.7 (1.1)
Poland 3.2 (1.3) 2.4 (1.1) 2.7 (1.1) 3.4 (1.2) 2.7 (1.2) 2.9 (1.1)
Bulgaria 3.3 (1.6) 2.0 (1.3) 2.4 (1.5) 3.1 (1.3) 2.3 (1.1) 2.7 (1.1)
Russia 3.7 (1.2) 2.2 (1.0) 2.0 (1.0) 3.7 (1.2) 2.4 (1.1) 2.4 (1.1)
Liberal countries
Australia 3.3 (1.3) 2.9 (1.2) 2.9 (1.2) 3.6 (1.2) 3.0 (1.1) 3.0 (1.2)
Great Britain 3.5 (1.1) 3.1 (1.1) 3.2 (1.2) 3.6 (1.2) 3.1 (1.1) 3.1 (1.2)
Northern Ireland 3.5 (1.2) 3.1 (1.2) 3.1 (1.2) 3.6 (1.2) 3.1 (1.2) 3.0 (1.2)
United States 3.7 (1.2) 3.1 (1.3) 3.2 (1.3) 3.8 (1.4) 3.2 (1.5) 3.2 (1.5)
Ireland 3.4 (1.3) 3.0 (1.3) 2.9 (1.3) 3.4 (1.2) 3.2 (1.2) 3.2 (1.2)
New Zealand 3.3 (1.2) 2.8 (1.2) 3.0 (1.2) 3.4 (1.2) 2.9 (1.1) 3.0 (1.2)
Social-democratic countries
Norway 3.3 (1.1) 3.1 (1.1) 3.1 (1.2) 3.5 (1.1) 3.5 (1.1) 3.3 (1.2)
Sweden 3.7 (1.1) 3.3 (1.2) 3.3 (1.2) 3.8 (1.0) 3.5 (1.2) 3.5 (1.2)
Netherlands 3.7 (1.1) 2.9 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 3.7 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 2.9 (1.1)
Countries not classified
Philippines 3.4 (0.9) 2.7 (1.0) 2.7 (1.0) 3.7 (1.1) 2.6 (1.1) 3.0 (1.2)
Israel 3.6 (1.2) 3.0 (1.2) 3.0 (1.2) 3.7 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1) 2.9 (1.2)
Japan 4.0 (1.3) 3.1 (1.5) 3.2 (1.4) 4.1 (1.3) 3.4 (1.4) 3.3 (1.4)
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002; response categories “strongly agree” (1), “agree” (2), “neither
agree nor disagree” (3), “disagree” (4) and “strongly disagree” (5), item warm relation
reverse-coded such that high values indicate non-traditional stances for all items.
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TABLE N.º 1
Means (standard deviations) of items related to the consequences of
female labor-force participation in 1994 and 2002Whether such a tendency to defend working mothers exists might be related to
particular characteristics of societies, such as the general orientation of poli-
tics with regard to gender inequality, and the general ideological climate. As
the following brief descriptions of the regime types suggest, such a tendency
is most likely in conservative welfare regimes and former socialist transfor-
mation societies, and should be absent in social-democratic and liberal wel-
fare regimes. 
The socialist countries were characterized by the attempt to achieve gen-
der equality from above. However, there was a consequential restriction to
the area of work (Lapidus, 1988). Women were to be active in the labor mar-
ket to a similar degree as men but this egalitarian attitude was not extended
to the sharing of household chores and childcaring responsibilities. Due to
the obligation to work under socialist rule, it comes as no surprise that – with
the exception of eastern Germany – female labor-force participation is often
regarded as an unwanted heritage of the old system (Panayotova and Brayfield,
1997; Zajda, 1994). However, because of this obligation to work, mothers
cannot be made responsible for working outside of the home. The same applies
to the economic necessity of a double income in post-socialist transformation
societies. Thus, even many traditional respondents who assume that children
suffer from labor-force participation of their mothers should display a marked
tendency to defend them from criticism. Eastern Germany is a special case in
so far, as the majority does not subscribe to the belief that children suffer from
labor-force participation of their mother. However, eastern Germans are likely
to react to the criticism of working mothers which had so much sway in western
Germany (see below) and, thus, show nevertheless a tendency to defend wor  -
king mothers.
In the social-democratic welfare regimes policy aims at leveling gender dif-
ferences in the public domain and within the families (Hantrais and Letablier,
1996). In addition to economic reasons (Gauthier, 1996) the women’s move-
ment and wide support of the society had a considerable impact on the imple-
mentation of this policy (Pfau-Effinger, 2001). A high degree of female labor-
force participation is facilitated by the provision of a comprehensive public
childcare system. Both its quality and quantity is at least on the same level as
in the socialist countries (Lohkamp-Himmighofen, 1993). The idea that work-
ing mothers are bad mothers does not easily come to mind in such a context.
In liberal welfare states market mechanisms are much less constrained,
and the understanding of equality is confined to equality of opportunity. A
reduction of gender differences has been rather a side effect of general anti-
discriminatory laws (Schäfgen and Spellerberg, 1998) but has never been
actively pursued by taking concrete life circumstances of women into account
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participation rate in such countries is not a consequence of active state inter-
ventions but, at least in part, a result of economic necessities (Gornick, 1999).
Since the relationship between the state and the family is characterized by
non-intervention, the provision of public childcare institutions is low (Friendly,
Rothman and Olman, 1991). However, due to the deregulation of the market,
the costs of private childcare are also relatively low (Esping-Andersen, 1999)
which facilitates the combination of family and work. In most of these coun-
tries, the idea that working mothers are bad mothers should thus not be par-
ticularly prominent. However, a more pronounced tendency to criticize wor  -
king mothers in the United States than in other countries of the liberal regime
type can be expected as a consequence of the strength of religious fundamen-
talism. 
In the corporatist regime type, gender differences are stabilized by meas-
ures which make a deviation from the breadwinner-husband-and-homemak-
er-wife ideal unattractive (Gauthier, 1996; Gornick, 1999). These measures are
ultimately motivated by the assumption of biologically-caused differential
abilities of women and men in the domains of work and family. In many of
these countries, e.g. in West Germany through 1976, the law stipulated that
a wife should only work if this was compatible with her role in the household
and the family (Limbach, 1988). In addition, due to the inflexibility of insti-
tutionalized –public as well as private– childcare it is generally necessary that
one parent stays at home. According to Treas and Widmer (2000: 1431), West
Germany is "… the archetype of a conservative state promoting breadwinner-
husband-and-homemaker-wife families ... a particularly extreme case in its
aversion to maternal employment". In southern European corporatist coun-
tries, kinship ties can often be utilized for childcare (Höllinger and Haller, 1990;
Lohkamp-Himmighofen, 1993). Thus, they can compensate for the insuffi-
cient formal childcare provision for small children (Flaquer, 2000; Oinonen,
2000). Yet this is not the case in Central European corporatist countries. A
tendency to defend working mothers should therefore be particularly strong
in these countries, in which criticism of working mothers was particularly
pronounced in the past.
To sum up: A tendency to defend working mothers should largely be asso-
ciated with more traditional attitudes in a country, because in such contexts crit-
icism of working mothers has also been frequent. The only exception might be
eastern Germany, where a tendency to defend working mothers is likely to be a
reaction to criticism of working mothers characteristic of western Germany. 
Which individual-level subgroups and country segments can reasonably
be expected with regard to gender-role traditionality assessed by the three
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quantitatively varying patterns of traditionality. Second, we expect at least one
qualitatively  distinct  subgroup  whose  members  defend  working  mothers.
Thus, we expect that traditionality and a tendency to defend working moth-
ers shape the structure of traditionality subgroups on the individual and the
country level. We expect more subgroups, however, of the first type, i.e.
which differ only in their level of traditionality, because “defending” subtypes
require a society to be relatively traditional in the first place.
In almost all previous studies, means of the answers to ISSP items were
used for the comparison of countries and the monitoring of observed cross-sec-
tional social change. In contrast, we will conduct multilevel latent-class (ML-
LC) analysis (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2008; Vermunt, 2003, 2008) which
combines conventional LC model analysis with a ML approach. To the best of
our knowledge, this method has never been applied to the ISSP gender-role
items, and there is only one study using conventional LC analysis, yet only for
a comparison of Japan and South Korea (Yun-Suk and Ki-Soo, 2005).
SAMPLES AND METHODS
Samples
The data analyzed stem from the two most recent waves of the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP) module “Family and Changing Gender Roles”. It
was conducted in 1994 and 2002 in 22 countries (or regions): Australia, Austria,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, western and eastern Germany, Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States (Zentralarchiv, 1997, 2004). Sample sizes in 1994 range from 646 in
Northern Ireland to 2.488 in Spain, and in 2002 from 429 in eastern Germany to
2.471 in Spain. 
Measures
The three ISSP items about the consequences of female labor-force participation
for children and family which will be used as indicators of different individual-
and higher-level traditionality subtypes were described in detail already in the
introduction. All three were administered with the following five categorical
response options: ‘strongly agree’ (1), ‘agree’ (2), ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (3),
‘disagree’ (4), and ‘strongly disagree’ (5). Responses were reverse-coded for warm
relation such that, for all items, low values denote traditional, and high values
non-traditional opinions. 
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tries: By a mishap, the fourth and fifth of the response categories were collapsed
when saving the 2002 data from the United States. Following the recommen-
dation in the ISSP codebook, all answers of respondents who have selected the
fourth or fifth response categories were treated as if they had ‘strongly dis-
agreed’. For child suffers and family suffers, this means that the traditionality of
U.S. respondents might be somewhat underestimated. However, for warm rela-
tion, this means that traditionality might be somewhat overestimated by this
item, as it is reverse-coded for our analysis. In the Czech Republic, all three
items have been retranslated for the 2002 survey. Also the answer categories
have been altered to some degree. It is particularly the first item, which might
have a different item difficulty in both years in this country. In Bulgaria, the
item contents were the same in 1994 and 2002, yet the response categories have
been changed. As the first item is reversely formulated in comparison to the
other two, this change might have affected the answers to the three items dif-
ferently in this country. 
We  will  focus  exclusively  on  the  individual-level  variables  gender,  age
(which is more likely to be related to cohort than life-cycle effects), and educa-
tion, as these three variables have been shown repeatedly to be the most impor-
tant ones related to differences in gender-role attitudes (e.g. Alwin, Braun and
Scott, 1992). Gender is taken into account as a dummy variable with being male
as baseline category. Age will be included as a continuous variable. Education
will be entered as a nominal variable with the three categories: “lower second-
ary education or less”, “upper secondary”, and “university education”. 
Statistical analyses
The analysis method applied here has not only to take into account ordinality
of the indicators but also the multilevel structure of the data, as respondents
are nested in countries. Therefore, a multilevel (ML) extension of the conven-
tional latent-class (LC) model will be used (Vermunt, 2003, 2008; Asparouhov
and Muthén, 2008). In contrast to cluster analysis, the application of a ML-LC
model prevents that results are biased as a consequence of erroneous normali-
ty and linearity assumptions (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005) which are not met
by ordinal indicators as those obtained with the three ISPP items. Using ML-
LC analysis instead of conventional LC models allows for the simultaneous
estimation of latent classes of individual respondents and segments of coun-
tries. Countries are clustered based on the likelihood with which their respon-
dents belong to different individual-level classes, i.e. subgroups of respondents
with distinct gender-role traditionality answer profiles. 
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2005). In order to determine the number of individual-level subgroups and
country segments which are required to explain subgroup answer profile dif-
ferences sufficiently, first ML-LC models with a simultaneously increasing
number of gender-role traditionality subgroups and country segments will be
computed. Their relative fit will be compared by means of the Bayes and the
Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (BIC and CAIC). Lower values of
these indices indicate better model fit. Yet there are no established guidelines
about the size BIC differences should have to gauge different class solutions
as substantively meaningful. Therefore, theoretical interpretability, appropri-
ateness of class sizes, degree of certainty of subgroup allocations (classifica-
tion error) as well as the parsimony of class solutions with only minimal BIC
and CAIC differences will be taken into account as equally important criteria
in the decision about which model solutions are the most reasonable.
RESULTS
Identification of the most reasonable ML-LC model
The BIC and CAIC values decrease continuously for models with one to six
country segments and increase for models with seven in comparison to six
country segments for the data from both time points (see Table 2). This suggests
accepting a model with six higher-level classes. A decision about the optimal
number of individual-level subgroups based merely on these information crite-
ria, however, is less clear-cut: Decreasing BIC and CAIC values for one to seven
individual-level subgroups combined each with up to four country segments
speak in favor of seven subgroups. Solutions with eight individual subgroups do
not converge already for models with one country segment, and thus indicate
that the respective number of individual subgroups would be an over-specifica-
tion. The same holds also for models with seven subgroups and five and more
country segments. Thus, according to the two information criteria, a model with
six country segments and six subgroups (M6C_6I) yielded the best fit for the
data from both time points. Yet a comparison of this model and the model with
the same number of subgroups but only five country segments (M5C_6I) led us
to accept the latter: Judged on the basis of the bivariate residual correlations, it
explains the answer covariance equally well as model M6C_6I. Furthermore, the
sizes of and the answer profiles for the six subgroups as well as the classification
errors according to both these models are almost identical. Finally, we could not
derive a theoretically sound interpretation of two of the country segments pro-
posed by model M6C_6I. Therefore we accepted model M5C_6I as the most the-
oretically meaningful and parsimonious solution for both time points.
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Model  BIC CAIC CC BIC CAIC CC
M1C-1I  264823 264735 0 243286 243199 0
M1C-5I  243546 243341 14 222481 222278 14
M1C-6I  241694 241459 14 221936 221704 14
M1C-7I  241089 240825 15 221416 221155 15
M1C-8I  no convergence
M2C-1I  264834 264738 0 243296 243202 0
M2C-5I  239538 239295 14 221006 220767 14
M2C-6I  238194 237915 16 220152 219877 17
M2C-7I  237435 237120 16 219612 219301 18
M3C-1I  264844 264741 0 243307 243205 0
M3C-5I  238751 238472 15 220099 219824 14
M3C-6I  237021 236698 16 219292 218974 17
M3C-7I  236296 235930 16 218648 218286 17
M4C-1I  264854 264744 0 243317 243208 0
M4C-5I  238296 237981 15 219860 219549 18
M4C-6I  236368 236002 16 218670 218307 18
M4C-7I  235645 235226 16 218036 217623 18
M5C-1I  264865 264747 0 243227 243211 0
M5C-5I  238137 237784 16 219732 219384 16
M5C-6I  236159 235748 16 218504 218098 17
M5C-7I  no convergence from now on
M6C-1I  264875 264750 0 243337 242314 0
M6C-5I  236043 235588 16 219603 219219 18
M6C-6I  235339 234818 16 218335 217885 18
M7C-1I  264885 264753 0 243348 243217 0
M7C-5C  237992 237566 16 219534 219114 14
M8C-6I  235941 235442 16 211883 217690 18
M5C6I_cov  238257 237978 38 216976 216461 18
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002.
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TABLE N.º 2
Fit measures (BIC=Bayesian Information Criterion; CAIC= Consistent
Akaike Information Criterion; CC=classification error) for selected
models with different numbers of country (C) segments and
individual-level (I) subgroupsSizes and conditional answer profiles of the individual-level subgroups 
Table 3 shows the sizes and the answer probabilities for the three items of the six
traditionality subgroups in 1994 and 2002. Four subgroups have only quantita-
tively varying answer probabilities indicating different but similarly shaped tradi-
tionality levels of gender-role attitudes. The first is an extreme traditional sub-
group. Its members, about 6% of the respondents in 1994 and 4% in 2002, have
a high probability to express traditional answers to the three gender-role items. A
second traditional subgroup is the largest one with 40% and 37% of the respon-
dents in 1994 and 2002, respectively. It has the second highest probabilities for
traditional answers. Thus, respondents of these two subgroups apparently repre-
sent traditional individuals for whom criticism and defence of working women is
not an issue. In contrast, the probabilities to endorse the three items (after recod-
ing of the third item) are only low and extremely low in a third and fourth sub-
group. These non-traditional and extremely non-traditional subgroups comprise
33% and 7% of the respondents in 1994, and 38% and 8% in 2002.
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TABLE N.º 3
Sizes and conditional answer probabilities (mean probabilities) for the
individual-level latent traditionality classes
Year Extreme  Traditionals Non- Extreme  Traditional  Moderate 
traditionals traditionals non- defenders defenders
traditionals
Size (%)  1994 5.7 39.6 33.0 6.5 5.9 9.2
2002 4.1 36.6 33.7 8.0 4.4 13.2
Warm     1994 .85 .53 .27 .02 .09 .06
relation 2002 .83 .51 .26 .04 .06 .10
Child     1994 .99 .71 .36 .05 .94 .59
suffers 2002 .99 .70 .33 .03 .95 .56
Family    1994 .98 .70 .35 .05 .95 .48
suffers 2002 .98 .69 .35 .02 .94 .49
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002.
As expected, the distinguishing characteristics of two further subgroups are not
only different traditionality levels but also a particular tendency to defend
working mothers which can be inferred from opposite endorsement probabili-
ties for the three items. The fifth subgroup, labeled traditional defenders in the
following, endorses the items child and family suffers with a high probability(comparable to the members of the extreme traditional subgroup) but the item
warm relation with a low probability (comparable to the members of the extreme
non-traditional subgroup). The same opposite answer patterns holds for the sixth
subgroup, moderate defenders, although its answer probabilities for the items
child and family suffers are less extreme, with values located between those of
the members of the “pure” traditional and non-traditional subgroups. With regard
to the low probability to endorse warm relation it does not differ from the fifth
subgroup. 
While both the number of traditionality subgroups and their conditional
answer profiles are virtually identical in 1994 and 2002, there is a shift in their
sizes.  Sizes  decreased  for  all  traditional  subgroups  (including  traditional
defenders), while those for all non-traditional subgroups (including moderate
defenders) increased, although only moderately. Since the structure of these
subgroups did not change between the two time points, we can interpret the
change in their sizes in a straightforward way.
Predictors of the structure of individual-level traditionality subgroups
Separate analyses of model M5C_6I involving age, gender or education as covari-
ates reveal that all three variables influence individual-level subgroup member-
ship significantly at both time points. Table 4 depicts the unstandardized regres-
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TABLE N.º 4
Impact (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients) of demographic
variables on individual-level subgroup composition
Year Extreme  Traditionals Non- Extreme  Traditional  Moderate 
traditionals traditionals non- defenders defenders
traditionals
Age         1994 .02** .01** -.02** -.02** .02** -.01*
2002 .02** .01** -.02** -.02** .01* -.01*
Education:
1 low 1994 .24** .15* -.09 -.50** .27 -.06
2002 .15* .20** -.04 -.61** .29** -.09
2 medium 1994 .12 .01 -.07 -.07 -.06 .06
2002 .03 .04 -.03 -.09 .06 -.01
3 high     1994 -.36** -.16** .16** .58 -.21** .00
2002 -.19** -.24** .08 .60** -.35** .10
Female    1994 -.11** -.18** -.05 .24** -.01 .10
2002 -.13** -.17** -.02 .28** -.02 -.06
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002.sion coefficients reflecting their impact on response probability patterns and sub-
group sizes, when their influence is simultaneously accounted for by Model
M5C_6I computed both for 1994 and 2002. 
To summarize the most interesting results of these analyses: As could be
expected, membership in all traditional subgroups is positively associated
with age, while the probability to be a member of a non-traditional subgroup
(including a moderate tendency to defend working mothers) is negatively
related to age. Low education as well as being male enhances the probability
to belong to one of the traditional subgroups but reduces the likelihood to be
a member of the extremely non-traditional subgroup. For high education sig-
nificant associations in the opposite directions are observable, and being female
makes a membership in the extremely non-traditional subgroup more likely.
These observations are in line with previous findings about the influence of
these demographic variables on gender-role attitudes, and thus corroborate also
the formal validity of our individual-level class solution.
Composition and meaning of the five higher-level country segments
The five higher-level country segments can be interpreted by the probabilities
with which their populations belong to the six individual-level traditionality sub-
groups. For the countries of the first and largest higher-order segment (with ten
and six countries in 1994 and 2002, respectively) it is most probable that its
respondents are non-traditionals (Table 5). Traditionals form the second largest
group. Both extreme traditionals and extreme non-traditionals are of minor impor-
tance. While the likelihood of belonging to the non-traditionals is slightly increas-
ing between both points in time, for the extreme non-traditionals it is decreasing.
The mixed individual-level subgroups, traditional and moderate defenders, do not
play any role. This country segment can be labeled as non-traditional dominance.
Respondents of the second largest country segment (comprising five and
six countries in 1994 and 2002, respectively) most likely belong to the tradi-
tionals, though with some decrease from 1994 to 2002. Non-traditionals are the
second most probable subgroup for this country segment, while all other indi-
vidual-level traditionality subgroups can be neglected for all practical purposes.
Thus, this country segment is characterized by traditional dominance.
Among the respondents of the three countries allocated to the third seg-
ment in 1994 and 2002, again traditionals dominate, although again with some
decrease in numbers between both points in time. However, it is very unlikely
that their nationals are non-traditionals or extreme non-traditionals. On the
contrary, being either moderate or traditional defenders is quite likely for these
respondents. While the number of moderate defenders considerably increases
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.from 1994 to 2002, traditional defenders become less numerous. Extreme tradi-
tionals are also a non-negligible subgroup, though their size is on the decline.
Thus, this higher-order segment can be interpreted as traditional defence.
The individual-level subgroup composition of the fourth segment with
two and five countries in 1994 and 2002, respectively, resembles that of the
third country segment with regard to the likely presence of defenders. Mo  -
derate defenders are most frequent, with some decline over time. Yet tradition-
al defenders of working mothers as well as extreme traditionals are very unlikely.
Traditionals, with an increase over time, non-traditionals, with a decrease over
time, and extreme non-traditionals, with a comparable frequency at both time
points, are of roughly equal probability. Thus, this higher-order segment is
characterized by a moderate defence.
In contrast to the first four segments the fifth apparently has a different
meaning in 2002 compared to 1994, since the nationals of the two countries
allocated to it at each time point have completely different probabilities to
belong to the six individual-level traditionality subgroups. In 1994, they are
most probably moderate defenders of working mothers followed by tradition-
als. Traditional defenders and, with a clearly lower likelihood, extreme tradi-
tionals are also present, while non-traditional subgroups are virtually absent.
Thus, in 1994 nationals of the two countries are located in-between those of
the countries forming the moderate and traditional defence segments. Thus,
we simply call it defence. In contrast, the nationals of the two countries clus-
tered in the fifth segment in 2002 have a zero probability to belong to the two
subgroups characterized by defending working mothers. On the contrary,
they most probably are non-traditionals or, with a markedly lower probabili-
ty, traditionals or extreme non-traditionals. Thus, in 2002 this country segment
is even less traditional than the first higher-level segment. Thus, we label it
pronounced non-traditional dominance.
Distribution of the countries across higher-level country segments and of tradi-
tionality subgroups within each country in 1994 and 2002
The six individual-level traditionality subgroups are almost identically struc-
tured at both time points. Yet, because of a classification error of about 18% and
after the inspection of the posterior probabilities for each subgroup, it has to
be taken into account that in particular allocations to the smaller subgroups
involve some uncertainty. As a consequence, the same can also be expected for
the clustering of individual countries into higher-order segments. Thus, tran-
sitions of countries across the five higher-order segments between both points
in time cannot be taken as a straightforward indication that attitudes have
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a consequence of only small variations in the classification of their nationals
into  adjacent  individual-level  traditionality  subgroups.  Thus,  in  order  to
address the question whether attitudes have changed in a country, we will not
only consider country transitions over the higher-order segments. Instead, we
will also take into account changes within countries with regard to the distri-
bution of individual-level subgroups.
According to Table 6, in 1994 the first higher-level segment, non-tradi-
tional dominance, comprises all Anglo-Saxon countries surveyed, plus the
Netherlands, Israel, Norway, and Sweden. In 2002, the United States change
from this segment into the moderate defence segment. According to Table 7,
for U.S. respondents the probabilities of being traditionals and non-tradition-
als have decreased in 2002 in comparison to 1994, while those of being mod-
erate defenders and extreme non-traditionals have increased. While the rise in
the number of the latter might be an artifact due to the error which occurred
when saving the data mentioned above, the increase of the former cannot be
explained in such a way. 
In 2002, Israel is also not longer assigned to the first but to the second
segment of countries, traditional dominance. Table 7 shows, however, only a
slight change in a traditional direction. Apparently, the classification of Israel
to a segment is rather uncertain, and its assignment to different but narrow-
ly adjacent country segments in 1994 and 2002 should not be over-interpret-
ed as reflecting a marked change in attitudes. Finally, in 2002 also Norway
and Sweden do no longer belong to the first segment but form a separate one.
According to Table 7, the nationals of these countries have moved markedly
from the traditional subgroups to the non-traditional or extreme non-tradition-
al subgroups. This is an impressive trend in a non-traditional direction which
makes these two countries unique.
The second country segment, traditional dominance, is composed of the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Spain, and the Philippines in 1994. In
2002, however, the Czech Republic is no longer allocated to this segment but
to the fourth, moderate defence. As was the case for the United States, also in
the Czech Republic both traditionals and non-traditionals are less frequent in
2002 than in 1994, while the opposite is true for moderate defenders and
extreme non-traditionals. These differences are so pronounced that it is rather
improbable  that  they  are  only  caused  by  attitudinal  change.  Rather  they
might also be a consequence of altered item translations. Thus, these obser-
vations have to be interpreted with caution. In 2002, Bulgaria and, as already
mentioned,  Israel  are  assigned  to  the  second  segment  in  2002.  In  1994,
Bulgaria clustered in the third segment, traditional defence. In 2002, moderate
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TABLE N.º 6
Distribution of countries across group classes 1994 and 2002
1994 2002
Western Germany 5A 4
Austria 5A 3
Spain 22
Eastern Germany 44
Hungary 33
Czech Republic 24
Slovenia 22
Poland 22
Bulgaria 32
Russia 33
Australia 11
Great Britain 11
Northern Ireland 11
United States 14
Ireland 11
New Zealand 11
Norway 1 5B
Sweden 1 5B
Netherlands 11
Philippines 22
Israel 12
Japan 44
Note: 1 = non-traditional dominance; 2 = traditional dominance; 3 = traditional defence;
4 = moderate defence; 5A = defence; 5B = pronounced non-traditional dominance.
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002.Michael Braun y Angelika Glöckner-Rist 180
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TABLE N.º 7
Distribution of individual latent classes in the different countries (in %)
Extreme  Traditionals Non- Moderate Extreme  Traditional
traditionals traditionals defenders non- defenders
traditionals
1994  2002 1994  2002 1994  2002 1994  2002 1994  2002 1994  2002
Western  8331 28 4 12 36 40 4 10 17 7
Germany
Austria 10 8 19 33 2537 32 66 26 16
Spain 4354 48 39 41 031322
Eastern  1113 9 17 15 48 48 17 22 46
Germany
Hungary 18 9 39 37 6717 32 23 18 13
Czech  8447 27 37 18 0 34 3 10 57
Republic
Slovenia 5258 48 32 39 031245
Poland 5455 47 33 49 041263
Bulgaria 17 6 38 60 7 25 13 25220 5
Russia 9852 45 6915 28 12 17 8
Australia 6446 42 38 48 009610
Great  2236 37 53 55 009511
Britain
Northern  3535 33 54 56 007512
Ireland
United  3533 26 48 11 0 27 13 27 24
States
Ireland 5343 37 41 55 00 10 610
New  4445 44 44 49 006310
Zealand
Norway 2140 28 50 57 007 13 10
Sweden 2131 27 53 52 00 13 21 10
Nether- 2341 42 48 51 007410
lands
Phili- 1259 47 38 38 060126
ppines
Israel 3340 43 48 42 057324
Japan 3419 17 21 16 33 36 18 23 65
Source: ISSP 1994, 2002.defenders do not play a role any more. Instead the “regular” traditional and
non-traditional subgroups have both increased and extreme traditionals have be  -
come less frequent. However, the seeming decline of the traditional defenders
can also be, at least partially, an artifact due to a change in the translation of
the response categories.
In 1994, the third country segment, traditional defence, is formed by Hun  -
gary, Bulgaria, and Russia. As mentioned, in 2002 Bulgaria does no longer fall in
this segment, while Austria is assigned to it. 
The fourth country segment, moderate defence, includes only eastern
Germany and Japan in 1994. Yet in 2002, western Germany, the Czech Republic,
and the United States are also assigned to this segment: Both western Ger  -
many and Austria have witnessed rather small changes between 1994 and
2002. Western Germany has moved slightly more in a non-traditional direc-
tion than Austria, with the consequence that the former is included in the
fourth group, moderate defence, but the latter in the third one, traditional defence.
Presumably, both cases were borderline already in 1994 when both countries
constituted an exclusive class. 
The  fifth  country  segment  in  1994  comprises  western  Germany  and
Austria. It is located between the third and fourth segments. As we have seen
before,  these  two  countries  are  allocated  to  different  segments  in  2002:
Western Germany to the fourth, moderate defence, and Austria to the third,
traditional defence. The fifth country segment in 2002 is characterized by a
pronounced non-traditional dominance. It comprises Norway and Sweden. In
1994, these countries fell into the first segment of countries, non-traditional
dominance. The fact of their leaving this country segment and forming a sep-
arate one indicates a markedly stronger trend in a non-traditional direction
in Norway and Sweden than in the other countries belonging to the first seg-
ment in 1994. 
In a nutshell, segment membership varies for one third of the 22 countries.
Most of them change into adjacent segments. As outlined above, only the fifth
country segment has an entirely different meaning in 1994 and 2002. Thus, it
is not surprising that it comprises two different countries in these two years. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated whether there are different patterns of traditionality
with regard to the perceived consequences of female labor-force participation
for their children. Multilevel latent-class (ML-LC) analysis was used to iden-
tify  traditionality  subgroups  based  on  three  items  used  in  the  Changing
Family and Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Program
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1994 and 2002. Latent classes of individual respondents and segments of coun-
tries were estimated simultaneously. Six individual-level subgroups and five
country segments turn out to be the most reasonable solution for both points in
time. The structure of individual-level subgroups is practically identical for both
years: four classes represent only quantitatively varying levels of gender-role tra-
ditionality (extreme traditionals, traditionals, non-traditionals, and extreme non-
traditionals), while two are primarily characterized by a unique tendency to
defend working mothers against criticism (traditional and moderate defenders).
Even in the relatively short time span of eight years, a decrease of the more tra-
ditional subgroups in favor of the less traditional is revealed. 
Four of the five country segments are identical in both years. Traditional
dominance and non-traditional dominance are characteristic for those countries
where the tendency to defend working mothers does not seem to play a role, i.e.
where pure types of traditionality or non-traditionality dominate. The countries,
where the tendency to defend working mothers does play a role, form the coun-
try segments of tradititional and moderate defence. The fifth country segment in
each year is specific. There is also a change in the composition of the country
segments. However, not all of this change seems to be substantial. Rather, part
of it is apparently due to the fact that some countries are classified with a high
uncertainty to specific segments. Another part might to some degree represent
methodological artifacts, i.e. changes observed for the United States, the Czech
Republic, and Bulgaria might be due also to data-coding mistakes and altered
item wordings and answer options.
However, the exceptional position of Norway and Sweden seems to be a
substantial result. Both countries are special with regard to the speed of social
change, though they have already reached a high level of non-traditionality.
It is also remarkable how fast change in a non-traditional direction in sever-
al of the eastern European societies has gained momentum after the collapse
of socialism. An earlier expectation was that of a reestablishment of tradition-
al role models. The u-curve observed for Hungary between 1988 and 2002 by
Braun and Scott (2009) – a traditional backlash followed by a non-tradition-
al trend – seems to apply for other former socialist countries, too. These
countries are on a good way towards less traditional attitudes.
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